

Comparative Political Economy
Higher School of Economics
Center for the Study of Institutions and Development
DRAFT December 20, 2014
Spring 2015

INSTRUCTORS

Tim Frye (Columbia University) tmf2@columbia.edu
Alexander Libman (Frankfurt School of Finance & Management) a.libman@fs.de
Israel Marques (Columbia University) im2219@columbia.edu
Thomas Remington (Emory College) polstfr@emory.edu
John Reuter (University of Wisconsin – Milwaukee) ojreuter@gmail.com

COURSE DESCRIPTION

This course aims to make graduate students familiar with the major concepts, theories, and debates in comparative political economy.

REQUIREMENTS

Three referee reports on any of the articles or books on the syllabus. The report must be circulated to the class prior to our meeting. E-mail is fine. These are not literature reviews, but should demonstrate your analytical skills.

The reports should have three components:

- The report should briefly (one paragraph) sum up the main argument made by the author and the evidence provided.
- The report should contain an evaluation and critique of the author's argument and evidence. Does the author's argument make sense? Why or why not? Does the evidence (if any) comport with his/her argument? Why or why not? Do you know of other evidence that undermines (or supports) the author's argument? Does one of the other readings for that day offer a perspective that is discordant with the perspective offered by the author? This section should constitute the lion's share of the paper.
- The report should conclude with a recommendation (reject the manuscript, major revision, minor revision, publish as is) to the (fictitious) editor.

These reports should be 2-3 pages. The first referee report is due by 2/24, the second is due by 3/31, and the third is due by 5/19. **Each report constitutes 10% of the final grade.**

One seminar paper, due June 25. In session 3, we will discuss research strategies. The paper should be about 10-15 (but can be longer) pages and can be either:

- A research proposal that identifies a theoretical or empirical puzzle worth exploring, reviews and critiques existing literature, lays out hypotheses to be tested, identifies appropriate methods for testing the argument, and discusses the potential strength and weaknesses of the proposal. Research proposals need not actually collect the data and conduct the analyses, although it is hoped that this can be done in the future.
- A research paper that is written with the goal of submission to an academic journal. It includes all the steps of a research proposal, but also conducts some preliminary data collection and analysis.

A weak essay will simply do the above. A strong paper will propose a novel topic that sheds light on an important debate, identify how and why this paper may make a contribution to the literature, and propose a reasonable research strategy. A strong paper will also include a careful critique of the research design identifying the strengths and weaknesses of the proposal. This is a chance for you to begin to develop your own ideas for research even if you do not have time to actually collect the data necessary to assess the argument.

To assist in the writing process, we will ask you to submit some preliminary assignment: a one-page research proposal describing two or three potential research questions, dependent variable, possible sources of data, etc. for the paper, due before March 3, comprehensive outlines, due by May 26; and a full draft of the paper, due during the final class. In all, the paper and related assignments are worth **30% of the final grade.**

Failure to submit a research paper will result in a failing grade.

Final Exam. A exam based on all material of the semester will be given the week of July 1. **30% of the final grade**

Discussion. A critical component of the course is lively discussion of the week's readings. You should be prepared to discuss each reading on the syllabus for each week. You have not really done the readings until you are able to succinctly restate the argument, describe the methodology, and identify some strengths and weaknesses of the work. In other words, reading the article once, or worse, skimming the abstract, the introduction and conclusion alone, will not be sufficient. We will discuss several strategies for reading articles to get the most out of them.

You should assess the logical consistency, clarity, and novelty of the theoretical argument. Does it produce new insights? Are the assumptions of the theory clear and

reasonable? Is the logic of the theory internally consistent? Do the hypotheses flow logically from the theory? Does the theory generate hypotheses that could be tested, but are not? Does the theory suggest possible causal mechanisms? Are those mechanisms tested?

You should also assess the evidence provided in support of the argument. Are the empirical tests convincing? Are the procedures used to assess the argument described adequately? Are the measures valid and reliable? Does the author consider multiple mechanisms which may link variables? Are other interpretations of the evidence more plausible? What of the possibility of reverse causality, omitted variable bias, selection bias, and endogeneity? How important are these problems? Can they be addressed? If so, how? What other tests could have been done to assess the argument?

You should also consider the implications of the argument. Has the author made claims that extend beyond the evidence? Are the findings important? If so, for what? For substantive outcomes? For normative reasons? For social science? (Filling a hole in the literature is not always a reason to write an article. Some holes aren't worth filling.) Has the author convinced you that you should care about the finding? How does this work relate to similar work? To what related topics could the theory, evidence, or research design apply? Are there policy implications for the work?

Evaluation Summary:

- 30% Three referee reports
- 30% Seminar paper
- 30% Final
- 10% Discussion during seminar

Session 1. January 13. Social Choice, Cooperation, and Collective Action

Kenneth A. Shepsle and Mark S. Bonchek. 2010. *Analyzing Politics*. 2nd ed Chapters 4, and Chapter 5 selection, Chapter 8 231-245, Chapter 9 262-292 and Chapter 10

Recommended:

William H. Riker. 1986. *The Art of Political Manipulation*. Chapter 3.

David Austen-Smith. 1998. *Annual Review of Political Science*. "Social Choice Theory, Game Theory, and Positive Political Theory." 1:259-287.

Nolan McCarty and Adam Meirowitz. 2007. *Political Game Theory*. Chapter 4.

Session 2. January 20. Causal Inference, Endogeneity, and Model Specification

Herbert Kitschelt. 2002. "Accounting for Postcommunist Regime Diversity: What Counts as a Good Cause? In *Capitalism and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe*, ed. Gregorz Ekiert and Stephen Hanson, Cambridge University Press. https://netfiles.uiuc.edu/fesnic/fspub/Kitschelt_Good_Cause.pdf

Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson. 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development." *American Economic Review*. 91:5 1369-1401.

Banerjee, Abhijit V., and Esther Duflo. (2008). "The Experimental Approach to Development Economics." <http://www.nber.org/papers/w14467.pdf>

Recommended:

Edward Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer "Do Institutions Cause Growth?" *Journal of Economic Growth*, September, 2004

Adam Przeworski, "The Last Instance: Are Institutions the Primary Cause of Development?" *European Journal of Sociology* 45:2, 165-188.

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson. 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation. *American Economic Review* 91: 1369-1401.

Albouy, David. 2012. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation: Comment." *American Economic Review* 102: 3059-3076.

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson. 2011. "Hither Thou Shalt Come, But No Further: Reply to "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation: Comment. Ms.

Deaton, A (2009) "Instruments of development: Randomization in the tropics, and the search for the elusive keys to economic development, NBER Working Paper 14690 <http://papers.nber.org/papers/w14690>

Guido W. Imbens Better LATE Than Nothing: Some Comments on Deaton (2009) and Heckman and Urzua (2009) http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/imbens/files/bltn_09apr10.pdf

Alan S. Gerber, Donald P. Green, and Edward H. Kaplan. "The Illusion of Learning from Observational Research." from *Problems and Methods in the Study of Politics*, edited by Ian Shapiro, Rogers M. Smith, Tarek E. Masoud . Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy Weinstein. 2009. "[Field Experiments and the Political Economy of Development](#)" *Annual Review of Political Science*

Duflo, Esther, Rachel Glennerster, and Michael Kremer, "Using Randomization in Development Economics Research: A Toolkit", <http://econwww.mit.edu/files/806> <http://www.nber.org/papers/t0333>

Lustick, Ian. 1996. "History, Historiography, and Political Science: Multiple Historical Records and the Problem of Selection Bias." *American Political Science Review* 90:3 605-18.

Session 3. January 27: Research Design and Writing a Paper

Darden, Keith and Grzymala-Busse, Anna. 2006. "[The Great Divide: Literacy, nationalism and the communist collapse. *World Politics*](#)." 59: 1, 83-115.

Patrick Dunleavy, blogs post below

<https://medium.com/advice-and-help-in-authoring-a-phd-or-non-fiction/seven-upgrade-strategies-for-a-problematic-article-or-chapter-3c6b81be9aa2>

<http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/impactofsocialsciences/2014/02/05/academics-choose-useless-titles/>

<http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/impactofsocialsciences/2012/11/28/lupton-30-tips-writing/>

Heath, Chip and Stan Heath *Made To Stick*. Intro, [Chapters 1, 4, 6 and Epilogue](#).

Huber, John. 2013. "Is Theory Getting Lost in the Identification Revolution?" ms. <http://themonkeycage.org/2013/06/14/is-theory-getting-lost-in-the-identification-revolution/>

Session 4. February 3. Interests Groups and Lobbying

Grossman, Gene and Elhanan Helpman, 2001. *Special Interest Politics* (selected pages).

Guriev, Sergei and Andrei Rachinsky, 2005, "The Role of Oligarchs in Russian Capitalism," *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*.

Olson, Mancur, 1982. *Rise and Decline of Nations* (selected pages).

Session 5. February 10. Corruption and Governance

Fisman, Raymond (2001), "Estimating the Value of Political Connections." *American Economic Review* 91 (4), pp. 1095-1102. http://www-1.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/rfisman/estimating_the_value.pdf

Claudio Ferraz and Fred Finan. (2008). "Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes", *QJE*, 123(2), 703-745. <http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1162/qjec.2008.123.2.703>

John McMillan, "How To Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru" *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 2004. 18:4, 69-92.

Recommended:

Olken, Benjamin and Patrick Barron. 2007. "The Simple Economics of Extortion: Evidence from Trucking in Aceh," <http://www.nber.org/papers/w13145.pdf>

Andrei Shleifer; Robert W. Vishny. "Corruption." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 108, No. 3. (Aug., 1993), pp. 599-617.

Daniel Treisman, "What Have We Learned about Corruption?" *Annual Review of Political Science*. 2007. 10:211-244.

Session 6. February 17. Social Policy

Esping-Anderson, Gosta. 1990. *Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chaps 1- 2.*

Estevez-Abe, Margarita, Soskice, David and Iversen, Torben. 2001. Social Protection and the formation of skills: a reinterpretation of the welfare state, in Hall, Peter and Soskice, David, eds., 2001, *Varieties of Capitalism*, Chapter 4.

Carnes, Mathew and Isabela Mares. 2007. "[Social Policy in Developing Countries](#)" *Annual Review of Political Science*. 2009: 12:93-113

Recommended:

Pierson, P. (2001). Coping with Permanent Austerity: Welfare State Restructuring in Advanced Democracies, in Pierson, P. (ed.), *The New Politics of the Welfare State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Swenson, Peter 1991. "Bringing Capital Back In, or Social Democracy Reconsidered." *World Politics* 43: 7, 513-544.

Mares, Isabela. (2005). Social Protection Around the World: External Insecurity, State Capacity, and Domestic Political Cleavages. *Comparative Political Studies*. 38(6), 623-651.

Iverson, Torben and Frances Rosenbluth, 2010. *Women, Work, and Politics: The Political Economy of Gender Inequality*. New Haven: Yale University Press, chapters 1, 2, and 5.*

Allan H. Meltzer and Scott F. Richard. 1981. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government." *Journal of Political Economy*. 89, 914-27.

Bartels, Larry. 2010. *Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age*. Princeton University Press. [1-4](#).

Lupu, Noam and Jonas Pontusson. 2011. "[The Structure of Inequality and the Politics of Redistribution](#)" *American Political Science Review*.

Mares, Isabela. 2001. *The Politics of Social Risk*, New York: Cambridge University Press, Chapter 2. C.

Shafer, Michael. 1994. *Winners and Losers: How Sectors Shape the Developmental Prospects of States* Cornell University Press, 1994 .

Lake, David and Matthew Baum. 2001. "[The Invisible Hand of Democracy: Political Control and the Provision of Public Services](#)," *Comparative Political Studies* 34: 587-621.

Session 7. February 24. Social Policy

Iversen, Torben and Soskice, David. 2001. An Asset Theory of Social Policy Preferences, *American Political Science Review*, 95: 4, 875- 893.

Mares, Isabela. 2003. *The Politics of Social Risk: Business and Welfare State Development*. New York: Cambridge University Press, Chapters 1 and 2.

Alesina, A., and Giuliano, P. (2011). Preferences for Redistribution. In J. Benhabib, A. Bisin, and M. Jackson (Eds.), *The Handbook of Social Economics*. Elsevier Press.

Recommended:

Denisova I, Eller M, Frye T, Zhuravskaya E. 2009. Who wants to revise privatization: the complementarity of institutions and market skills. *American Political Science Review*. 103(2):284--304

Alesina Alesina and Edward, Glaeser. 2004. *Fighting Poverty in the US and Europe: A World of Difference*. Oxford University Press. Chapters 4-6.

Rehm. Philip. 2009. "Risks and Redistribution: An Individual-Level Analysis." *Comparative Political Studies*. 42:7, 855-881.

Scheve, K. and Stasavage, D. 2009. Religion and the preferences for social insurance. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 1 (3) , 255-286

Giuliano. And Spilimbergo. 2014. Growing up in bad times, macroeconomic volatility and the formation of beliefs. *Review of Economic Studies*. 81 (2): 787-817.

Benabou and Ok. Social mobility and the demand for redistribution: the poun hypothesis. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*. 116:2, 447- 487.

De la O, Ana and Rodden, Jonathan. 2008. Does Religion distract the poor? Income and issue voting around the world. *Comparative political studies*. 41

Alesina, A. and Fuchs-Schundeln, N. (2007). ``Good-Bye Lenin (or Not?): The Effect of Communism on People's Preferences. *The American Economic Review*. 97(4): 1507-1528.

Session 8. March 3. Student Presentations

Session 9. March 10. Student Presentations

SPRING BREAK

Session 10. March 24. Institutions and Growth

Albouy, David. 2012. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation: Comment." *American Economic Review* 102: 3059-3076.

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson. 2011. "Hither Thou Shalt Come, But No Further: Reply to "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation: Comment. Ms.

North, Douglass C. and Barry R. Weingast. 1989. 'Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England.' *Journal of Economic History*. 49(4): 803-832.

Adam Przeworski, "Institutions Matter?," *Government and Opposition* 39(2) (2004): 527-540.

Recommended:

Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson. "Reversal Of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in The Making Of The Modern World Income Distribution." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 117 (4) 1231 -- 1294.

Sachs, Jeffrey. 2003, "Institutions Don't Rule: Direct Effects of Geography on Per Capita Income." NBER Working Paper 9490 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research). <http://www.nber.org/papers/9490>

Rodrik, Dani, Arvind Subramanian, and Francesco Trebbi "Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development" NBER WP 9305, October 2002. <http://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/9305.html>

Robert H. Bates, John H. Coatsworth, Jeffrey G. Williamson. 2009. "Lost decades: Lessons from post independence Latin America for Today's Africa" <http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/williamson/files/w12610.pdf>

Session 11. March 31. Institutions and Growth Continued

Stephen Haber et al. 2003. *The Politics of Property Rights: Political instability, Credible Commitments and Economic Growth in Mexico, 1876-1929*. Cambridge University Press.

Philip Keefer and Steven C. Knack. 2002. Polarization, Politics and Property Rights: Links Between Inequality and Growth. *Public Choice* 111 April 1-2, 127-154.

Session 12. April 7. Natural Resources

Michael L. Ross, "The Political Economy of the Resource Curse," *World Politics* 51(2) (1999): 297-322.

Daniel Treisman, "Is Russia Cursed by Oil?" *Journal of International Affairs* 63(2) (2010): 85-102.

Recommended:

Michael L. Ross, "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?," *World Politics* 53(3) (2001): 325-361.

Luong-Jones, Pauline and Erika Weinthal, 2010. *Oil Is Not a Curse: Ownership Structure and Institutions in Soviet Successor States* (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge University Press, ch. 1-2.

Sachs, J. and A. M. Warner. 2001. "The Curse of Natural Resources." *European Economic Review* 45(4-6): 827-38.

Ragnar, Torvik, 2009. "Why Do Some Resource-Abundant Countries Succeed While Others Do Not?" *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, 25:2, 241-256

Session 13. April 14. Federalism

Federalism as a Commitment Device. 1997. Yingyi Qian and Barry Weingast. <http://www-siepr.stanford.edu/workp/swp97042.pdf>

Hamilton's Paradox. Johnathan Rodden. 2006. Cambridge University Press. Selections.

Session 14. April 21. Institutional Legacy and Growth

History, Legacies, and Development (session 3)

Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson. "Reversal Of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in The Making Of The Modern World Income Distribution." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 117 (4) 1231 -- 1294.

Stanley L. Engerman and Kenneth L. Sokoloff. 2002. "Factor Endowments, Inequality, and Paths of Development among New World Economies *Economia*, Fall 2002. 41-109.

Abramson, Scott and Carles Boix. 2012. "The Roots of the Industrial Revolution: Institutions or Socially Embedded Know-How" Working Paper

Session 15. April 28. Informal Institutions

Knack, Stephen and Philipp Keefer. 1997. "Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff: A Cross-Country Investigation" *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*.

Helliwell, John and Robert Putnam. 1995. "Economic Growth and Social Capital in Italy. *Eastern Economic Journal*

Habyarimana, James, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel Posner, and Jeremy Weinstein. 2007. "Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision? An Experimental Approach", *American Political Science Review*,

MAY HOLIDAYS

Session 16. May 12. Political Machines

Susan Stokes, 2005. "Perverse Accountability." *American Political Science Review* 99:3, 315-325.

Simeon Nichter. 2008. "Vote Buying or Turnout Buying: Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot." *American Political Science Review* 102:1, 19-31.

Mares, Isabela and Boilang Zhu. "The structural determinants of electoral fraud in semi-competitive electoral systems: revisiting the case of Imperial Germany," ms. 2011.

Frye, Timothy, "Political Machines at Work: Workplace Mobilization and Electoral Subversion in Russia." Ms. HSE. Moscow. *World Politics*, April. 2014.

Recommended:

Philip Keefer and Razvan Vlaicu. 2008. "Democracy, Credibility and Clientelism." *Journal of Law, Economics and Organization*. October. 24 (2), pp. 371-406.

Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor and Jean Francois-Richard. 2003. "Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect." *European Economic Review* 47: 165-195.

Scott Gehlbach. 2006. "The Consequences of Collective Action: An Incomplete Contracts Approach." *American Journal of Political Science*. 50:3, 802-823.

Evans, Peter. "Predatory, developmental, and other apparatuses: a comparative political economy perspective on the third world state." *Sociological Forum (Springer)* 4, no. 4 (1989): 561-587.

Helmke, G, and S Levitsky. "Informal institutions and comparative politics: A research agenda." *Perspectives on Politics* 2, no. 04 (2004): 725-740.

Daron Acemoglu, James A. Robinson, Rafael J. Santos. *The Monopoly of Violence: Evidence from Colombia*
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1522367

Session 17. May 19. Autocracies

Geddes, Barbara. 2007. "What Causes Democratization?" In Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes, eds. *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*. New York: Oxford University Press: ch. 14.

Gehlbach, Scott and Philipp Keefer. 2012. "Private Investment and the Institutionalization of Collective Action in Autocracies: Ruling Parties and Legislatures" *Journal of Politics*.

Beatriz Magaloni. 2006. *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico*. Introduction and Ch. 1.

Recommended:

Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski. 2006. "Cooperation, Cooptation and Rebellion Under Dictatorships," *Economics and Politics*. 18,1, 1-25.

Przeworski, Adam, M Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and F Limongi. 2000. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*. Ch. 1 and 2.

Jennifer Gandhi. 2008. *Political Institutions Under Dictatorship*. Cambridge University Press, Ch. 1 and 3

Jason Brownlee. 2007. *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democracy*. Cambridge University Press.

Desai, R. M., Ologsgard, A., & Yousef, T. 2009. "The Logic of Authoritarian Bargains." *Economics and Politics* , 21 (1), 93-125.

Magaloni, Beatriz. 2008. "Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule." *Comparative Political Studies* 41(4): 715-741.

Bruce Buena de Mesquita and Alistair Smith. 2009. Political Survival and Endogenous Institutional Change." *Comparative Political Studies*. 42:2, 167-197.

Ronald. Wintrobe. 1990, "The Tinpot and the Totalitarian: An Economic Theory of Dictatorship." *American Political Science Review* 3, 849–872. J

Milan Svobik. 2008. "Authoritarian Reversals and Democratic Consolidation." *The American Political Science Review*. 102:2, 153-165. J

Levitsky, Steven and Lucan Way (2010). *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War*, Cambridge University Press. Ch.1-2

Jorge I. Domínguez (Spring 1993), "The Secrets of Castro's Staying Power", *Foreign Affairs* 72:2

Timothy Besley and Masayuki Kudamatsu. 2008. Making Autocracy Work. In *Institutions and Economic Performance*, edited by Elhanan Helpman (Harvard University Press), 452-510 (available online at: http://people.su.se/~mkuda/HOME_files/BesleyKudamatsu2008.pdf)

Carles Boix and Milan Svobik. 2013. The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government: Institutions, Commitment and Power-Sharing in Dictatorships. *Journal of Politics* 75:300-316

Johannes Gerschewski. 2013. The Three Pillars of Stability: Legitimation, Repression and Co-optation in Autocratic Regimes. *Democratization* 20:13-38

Egorov, Georgy and Konstantin Sonin. 2011. 'Dictators and their Viziers: Endogenizing the Loyalty-Competence Trade-off.' *Journal of the European Economic Association* 9:903-930

Wintrobe, Ronald. 1990. The Tinpot and the Totalitarian: An Economic Theory of Dictatorship. *American Political Science Review* 84: 849-872

Gandhi, Jennifer, and Adam Przeworski. 2006. Cooperation, Cooptation and Rebellion under Dictatorships. *Economics and Politics* 18:1-26

Gibson, Edward L. 2005. Boundary Control: Subnational Authoritarianism in Democratic Countries. *World Politics* 58:105-132

Congleton, Roger D.2001. On the Durability of King and Council: The Continuum between Dictatorship and Democracy. *Constitutional Political Economy* 12:193-215

Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson. 2006. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Cambridge University Press. Chapter 5, sections 5.1-5.4

Session 18. May 26. Presentations

Session 19. June 2. Presentations

Session 20. Day in Reserve. June 9.

Reading Period June 15-June 30.

Final Exam: To be announced June 30-July3.

DISTRIBUTION OF HOURS

Date	Topic	Lecture/Seminar Hours	Self-study hours	Suggested Lecturers	Live/ Video
January 13	Social Choice	4	6	Timothy Frye	Video
January 20	Causal Inference and Identification	4	6		Video
January 27	Research Design	4	6		Video
February 3	Interest Groups and Lobbying	4	6		Live

February 10	Corruption	4	6	Israel Marques	Live
February 17	Social Policy	4	6		Live
February 24	Social Policy	4	6		Live
March 3	Presentation	4	6	Alexander Libman	Video
March 10	Presentations	4	6		Video
March 24	Institutions and Growth	4	6	Tom Remington	Video
March 31	Institutions and Growth	4	6		Video
April 7	Natural Resources	4	6		Live
April 14	Federalism	4	6		Live
April 21	Legacies and Growth	4	6	John Reuter	Video
April 28	Informal Institutions	4	6		Video
May 12	Political Machines	4	6		Video
May 19	Autocracies	4	6		Video
May 26	Presentations	4	6	Alexander Libman	Live
June 2	Presentations	4	6		Live
June 9	Reserve Day	4	6	To Be Determined	TBD
Subtotal		48	64		
Total hours		112			
Total credits		2			